The Celtics made the tactical choice to disgrace Draymond Green while wearing Stephen Curry

After four Finals games, Stephen Curry displays a crazy address. For an outside player, thus compiling 137 points in four encounters (34.3 points on average) with 51% success on 2-points and 49% on 3-points is unbelievable, making it one of the most effective starters on the first. match of a final.

Indeed, if we represent the total points scored in the first four matches of the Finals in terms of TS% (or “True Shooting Percentage”, which takes into account the 2-points, less 3-points and the francs) , it appears to be the most effective final start since 1983, almost on par with Kevin Durant in the 2017 Finals.

The danger of laisser de l’espace with Stephen Curry…

It’s even more crazy that the Boston defense contests a lot of his shots, but Stephen Curry presents a definite 66.3% to the FG% on contested shots (defender between 60 and 120 cms) while still taking 11.5 per match. In comparison, Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown have 44.7 and 45.3%respectively.

Slightly decimating, to take into account all the players who have scored more than 15 points in the first four matches of the Finals (still since 1983), we can see on the other hand Draymond Green suffering.

But like the always very good Thinking Basketball detail, the two phenomena are linked.

Because the Celtics defend Stephen Curry most of the time by “drop coverage,” that is, by letting their interiors (Al Horford or Robert Williams) float behind the screen to prevent penetrations altogether. Even if the interiors of Massachusetts are much higher than usual on this type of strategy, at “drop coverage” offers no bad space or double MVP, in any case much more than on other strategies generally used to slow down Stephen Curry, based on doubles and defensive compensations.

… Pour prevent Draymond Green from playing the creators on 4-contre-3

Priest d’Ime Udoka et des Celtics, is the “drop coverage” that proved Stephen Curry’s briller, from the departure of quality principal Draymond Green, and to the deuxième créateur.

Weak shooter, the interior is also particularly useful in the Warriors’ attack because of his ability to cut the two -way on Stephen Curry, who tries to prevent the leader from getting out of the dribble, to take advantage of the “short roll” , on 4-against-3 situations. By privant de cette weapon, the Celtics rendent le moment total useless offensivement, and Steve Kerr ainsi dû jongler in a few minutes and in Game 4.

Will the Celtics continue down this path? Undoubtedly, since Stephen Curry’s low efficiency is enough for Boston, then this strategy eliminates a good part of the Warriors ’secondary game.

The only certainty is that this strategy exemplifies all the power of Stephen Curry when he is offered space. The leader has never been as effective in the first four matches of the Finals (54.5% of TS% in the 2015 Finals, 61.3% in 2016 in 2017, 56% in 2018, 60.8% to 4% in 2019 e.) while Draymond Green has never been too useful to him. Explain the article Sports Illustrated by the faith of the people and the vote of Stephen Curry became MVP in the Finals in 2015, also illustration why the principal force of the Golden State and always was to use the fear engendrée par la capacité de his lead to shoot out of dribble.

Among the voters who chose Andre Iguodala in 2015, Jason Lloyd explains having received a message from a Cavaliers member asking him why none of the nine voters had named Stephen Curry as the series MVP. the entire Cleveland defense had been built to slow Steph.

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